Transparency Report Reporting Period: January 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019
Government Demands for User Data
In the Reporting Period, Mozilla received the following.
| Legal Processes | Received | Data Produced |
|---|---|---|
| Search Warrants | 0 | 0 |
| Subpoenas | 0 | 0 |
| Court Orders | 0 | 0 |
| Wiretap Orders | 0 | 0 |
| Pen Register Orders | 0 | 0 |
| Emergency Requests | 0 | 0 |
| National Security Requests 1 | 0-249 | 0-249 |
Government Demands for Content Removal
In the Reporting Period, Mozilla did not receive any government requests for content removal from our services.
| Requesting Country | Requests Received | Data Produced |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | 0 | N/A |
Copyright and Trademark Requests
Copyright
In the Reporting Period, we received 8 Copyright Takedown Notices and 0 Counter Notices.
| Mozilla Service | Takedown Notices | Counter Notices |
|---|---|---|
| Firefox Add-ons | 7 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | |
| Other Services | 1 | 0 |
Trademark
In the Reporting Period, we received 4 Trademark Takedown Notices and 0 Counter Notices.
| Mozilla Service | Takedown Notices | Counter Notices |
|---|---|---|
| Firefox Add-ons | 4 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | |
| Other Services | 0 | 0 |
Personal Data Requests
In the Reporting Period, we received 757 requests.
| Service | Received |
|---|---|
| Mozilla | 427 * |
| 330 |
Supplement
Legislative Reform
During this reporting period, Mozilla continued our fight for greater data security and privacy across the globe. In the US, we released our US Consumer Privacy Bill Blueprint and we sent a letter to the US Congress about Facebook data sharing. In the wake of the US Supreme Court’s Carpenter ruling, we released two studies for Firefox users on privacy expectations of location information shared online.
In Kenya, we advocated for a strong data protection law, and spoke out against Kenyan legislation for a new ID system that would allow the government to collect the DNA, biometrics, and other sensitive data of everyone in Kenya. We also held a series of Lean Data Practices workshops in Nairobi with government, business, and civil society stakeholders.
The the EU Cybersecurity Act included an important provision that we advocated for to grant ENISA (the EU Cybersecurity Agency) a mandate to work with Member States to stand up government vulnerability disclosure programs. We also continued to speak out against legislation in Australia that dangerously undermines encryption (see here); although there is much more progress needed, our advocacy did lead to a limited government vulnerability disclosure program.
We continued to pushback on the EU Terrorist Content Regulation, and filed comments against the UK government’s overreaching white paper on Online Harms, which had worrying effects on individual liberties and the competitive ecosystem. And we spoke out strongly against India’s proposed intermediary liability rules, which would force all online intermediaries to censor and surveil their users and threatened encryption as well.
Threat Indicators & Data Disclosures
| Type of Disclosure | Number of Disclosures |
|---|---|
| Cybersecurity Threat Indicator | 0 |
| Other Specific User Data Disclosure | 0 |